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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This appeal by the Defendant-Appellant is from an order of the 
Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utahf County of Utahf American Fork 
Department, Honorable John Backlund, Judge granting a Summary 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent entered on June 15, 
1989, (App-45) and the denial for a new trial entered on July 20, 
1989, (App-46). The record on appeal is the Trial Court's supplied 
Index with page numbers assigned to each document herein after 
referred to as (R at Index No.)* The minute entry judgment dated 
June 15# 1989, is (R at 48) (App-45) and the minute entry judgment 
dated July 20, 1989, is (R at 18) (App-46). Also included in the 
brief is the set out of specific Exhibits under the cover Appendix 
(App). 
The amended appeal by the Defendant-Appellant is from an order 
of the Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Utah, 
American Fork Department, the auspicate unauthorized clerk-signed 
court orders dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42) and the ruling on 
motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989, (R at 2) 
(AR attach No. 2A). The amended record (AR) on appeal is the 
Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989, 
filed with the Trial Court on November 20, 1989, herein after 
referred to as (AR at paragraph No.) or (AR at attachment No.) 
specifically set forth on the Defendant's Record on Appeal Index 
filed on November 20, 1989. 
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The Appellant filed the Appeal on July 20, 1989, (R at 15); 
and the Amended Appeal on November 20, 1989; seeking the reversal 
of the Trial Court's rulings and remand for trial of the 
Appellant's Counterclaim, also is seeking restitution of property 
damages, and other damages and injuries suffered by the Appellant. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Judicial Code 78-
2a-3(d) and Constitution of Utah Art I Sec. 11 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
This action involves various claims against the Defendant-
Appellant brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent when the rent paid 
for storage unit facilities was increased, then decreased, then 
increased, then decreased. The Plaintiff-Respondent locked the 
Defendant-Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors May 1988 through 
September 10, 1988, in violation of the implied covenant—to 
undisturbed access—causing damages for trover and conversion of 
the Defendant-Appellant's business property. The Plaintiff-
Respondent denied this when accepting the cash rent for August and 
September 1988. Consequently, the Defendant-Appellant calculated 
lost earnings from historical earnings records and presented a lien 
commencing October 1988 through July 1989, with the appropriate and 
timely monthly amortizations, for rent to the Plaintiff-Respondent 
who recognized, received, and accepted them. Then the Plaintiff-
Respondent brought an action for unlawful detainer and restitution 
of the premises commencing in January 1989. The Defendant-
Appellant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Trial Court 
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granted a Summary Judgment against the Defendant-Appellant without 
a trial and without any consideration for the Defendant-Appellant's 
Counterclaim. The Plaintiff-Respondent/ despite a previous 
warning, executed the Summary Judgment against the Defendant-
Appellant, selling all of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his 
children's property, including the exempt property. The Defendant-
Appellant disputed with the Trial Court and the Plaintiff-
Respondent as to real poverty, accountability of property sold 
during—Oral Arguments—for bonding on appeal to experience the 
immediate implementation of a supplemental relief motion, whereby 
the Defendant-Appellant spent 8 days in the Utah County jail for 
the alleged contempt of court—not answering specific questions as 
requested by the Plaintiff-Respondent, and the Trial Court. The 
Defendant-Appellant has included the ensuing actions by the 
Plaintiff-Respondent in the appropriately filed Amended Docketing 
Statement dated November 20, 1989. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below. 
The Trial Court (Honorable John Backlund) denied the 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal and granted the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment which included dismissal of Defendant's 
Counterclaim with prejudice (R at 48). The actual order reflecting 
this ruling was entered by the court on June 15, 1989, (App-45). 
The Defendant filed several motions with the Trial Court commencing 
June 19, 1989, through July 21, 1989, (R at 45, 44, 38, 37, 36, 35, 
34, 33, 31, 30, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 17). The Plaintiff 
correspondingly filed several motions with the Trial Court 
commencing June 27, 1989,through July 14, 1989, (R at 42, 41, 40, 
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39, 29, 28). The Trial Court (Honorable John Backlund) denied the 
Defendants motions (R at 18). The actual order reflecting this 
ruling was entered by the court on July 20, 1989, (App-46). 
Defendant appeals from that judgment on July 20, 1989, (R at 15). 
The Defendant served the Notice of Appeal, WARNING—consequences 
of the action—sale of the Defendant's property—a property bond-
-and Notice of Extra Ordinary Writ on July 21, 1989. A copy is 
attached hereto as page (App-1) in the Appendix. The Plaintiff 
executed the sale on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon despite the warning-
-selling the Defendant's, his spouse's, and his children's exempt 
property. Immediately and subsequently, upon learning from the 
Defendant by telephone that the Court of Appeals Extra Ordinary 
Writ case No. 890455 was denied—also, that the Defendant's 
proposed Order to grant Temporary Restraining Order against the 
Plaintiff dated July 25, 1989, was denied, (R at 16). The 
Defendant filed several Motions for Disposition of Property (R at 
13 and 7). The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Objection to 
Disposition of Property (R at 4). The Trial Court (Honorable John 
Backlund) granted in part, Defendant's request for Disposition of 
Property (R at 2). The actual order reflecting this ruling was 
entered by the Trial Court on August 10, 1989, (AR at attach No. 
2A). The Defendant appeals from that judgment (AR at par. Nos. 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18), and (AR at attach No. 
2A, 2B, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14). 
The Plaintiff and Defendant appeared for Oral Arguments 
September 26, 1989, (AR at par. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7), and (AR 
at attach Nos. 1, 3, 2, 4, 6, and 5). Subsequent to—Oral 
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Arguments—i.e. bonding, the Trial Court instituted immediately/ 
upon request of the Plaintiff, a Supplemental Relief Motion, 
pursuant to Utah Judicial Code No. 78-3.8, (AR at par. Nos. 8, 9. 
10, 11/ 12, 13/ 14/ 15/ 16/ 17/ and 18)f and (AR at attach Nos. 8, 
9/ 10/ 11/ 12/ 13/ 14/ and 15). Subsequent to several motions and 
orders with the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals set the 
Appellant's briefing schedule due December 27 , 1989. 
C. Relevant Facts With Citations to the Record. 
The Respondent has painted/ where all can see, on the outside 
of the storage unit walls facing Interstate 15 near the American 
Fork/ Utah/ 5th East exit the professed claim: 
"Electronic Security. R.V. and Boat Spaces 
Personal and Business. You Keep the Key" 
whereby the Respondent explicitly implies a covenant to any tenant 
needing their facilities that the property is protected for both 
personal and business property stored in their facilities and the 
tenant has undisturbed access/ thus keeping the key. 
The Appellant entered into a month to month Rental Agreement/ 
which was provided by the Respondent/ as a condition of renting 
their facilities/ on June 12/ 1987 (R at 74) (App-42) for storage 
units Nos. 143 and 144 at the agreed monthly rental rate of $55 per 
month for both units. The Rental Agreement states, paragraph II 
Rent: 
"Owner may increase the Rent by notifying 
Occupant in writing at least 15 days prior to 
the first day of the month for which the 
Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall pay the 
Increased Rent from the date it becomes 
effective. An Occupant unwilling to pay the 
Increased Rent may terminate the Rental 
Agreement as provided in Item III below." 
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The Rental Agreement states, paragraph IIIr Period of Occupancy: 
"The Period of Occupancy created by this 
Rental Agreement shall begin as of the date of 
this Rental Agreement and shall continue from 
month to month. Occupant or Owner may 
terminate the Occupancy created by this Rental 
Agreement by delivering written notice to the 
other party of its intention to do so at least 
15 days prior to the last day of the Rental 
Month." 
The Appellant followed the terms and conditions of the 
Respondent's provided Rental Agreement (App-42) paying the agreed 
rent in the amount of $55 per month for both units until January 
1988 when the Respondent's duly authorized agent—with apparent 
authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, attempted to increase the rent in 
violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirements. A 
copy is attached hereto as page (App-2); Audrey Hooper's deposition 
dated April 29, 1989, Plaintiff's (Exhibit No. 4) and the 
Defendant's response as page (App-3) Defendant's (Exhibit 1), (R 
at 70). 
The Respondent properly and appropriately notified the 
Appellant of a rent increase to be effective the following month, 
February 1, 1988. The Appellant paid accordingly the appropriate 
$80 per month for both units, for each month, February 1988 through 
April 1988. 
The Respondent's duly authorized agent—with apparent 
authority—MS. Audrey Hooper, appropriately noticed the decreased 
rent April 20, 1988, to be effective May 1, 1988, and accepted the 
Appellant's timely paid and properly noticed rent payment, check 
No. 160. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-4) Defendant's 
(Exhibit 3), (R at 70). 
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The Respondent asserts in the Affidavit of Audrey Hooper dated 
April 29, 1989/ that she made a mistake, and explained this to the 
Appellant, (par. Nos. 5, 6, and 7). A copy is attached hereto as 
page (App-5), (R at 56). The Respondent declares in the deposition 
of Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 1989, (pages 10 and 11) that she 
did not explain this to the Appellant. A copy is attached hereto 
as page (App-6), (R at 50). Perhaps an act of fraud! 
The Respondents duly authorized agent—with apparent 
authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, subsequent to receiving the timely 
paid and appropriately noticed decreased rent check No. 160 in the 
amount of $55, immediately locked the Appellant's rent-paid storage 
unit doors, a violation of the impled covenant to undisturbed 
access then deposited the check in the bank on May 7, 1988. 
Admitted Respondent's Statement of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (R at 56 par. No. 14) 
The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized agent—with 
apparent authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of 
$55 for the month of June 1988, check No. 175. A copy is attached 
hereto as page (App-7), Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) and a 
letter dated June 6, 1988, indicating that the noticed rent 
increase dated May 24, 1988, was in violation of the Rental 
Agreement notification requirements specifically explained in the 
January 2, 1988, letter as page (App-3). A copy is attached hereto 
as page (App-8), Defendant's (Exhibit 4A), (R at 70). The 
Respondent continued with the willful and wanton violation of the 
impled covenant to undisturbed access admitted (R at 56 par. 
No. 14). 
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The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized agent—with 
apparent authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of 
$55 for the month of July 1988, check No. 190. A copy is attached 
hereto as page (App-7) Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) and a 
letter dated July 6, 1988, indicating a warning of the Respondent's 
persisted violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed access. 
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-9) Defendant's (Exhibit 4B), 
(R at 70). 
The Appellant again submitted to the duly authorized agent-
-with apparent authority— Ms. Audrey Hooper letter dated July 13, 
1988, a copy is attached hereto as page (App-10) Defendant's 
(Exhibit 4C), (R at 70), to no avail, since the Respondent 
persisted with the willful and wanton violation of the implied 
covenant to undisturbed access with full knowledge to the 
supervising principal, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, and Mr. Randy Miller, 
admitted (R at 56 par. No. 14). Further declared in the 
Respondent's Deposition of Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 1989, page 
No. 12. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-11). Moreover, the 
Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson dated May 15, 1989, (par. No. 2) (R 
at 56), as page (App-14). 
The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized agent—with 
apparent authority—Ms.Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of 
$55 for the month of August 1988, check No. 199, a copy is attached 
hereto as page (App-7) Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) to gain 
knowledge, letter dated August 13, 1988. A copy is attached hereto 
as page (App-12), (R at 70) that the Respondent had replaced the 
Hoopers with a Vera M. Alex, sending the timely payment of rent 
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back proclaiming/ MWe are asking you to vacate the units #143 and 
144 immediately." Nevertheless, the Respondent persisted with the 
willful and wanton violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed 
access keeping the Appellant's rent-paid storage units locked. 
Admitted (R at 56 par. No. 14). 
Finally going into the 5th month the Appellant/ tried again 
to mitigate damages by placing in the hands of the new managers/ 
the duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—the September 
1988 rent payment in the amount of $55/ check No. 221 as page (App-
7)/ (R at 70) which he held in abeyance commingled with a letter 
dated September 9f 1988. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-
13)/ (R at 70)/ whereby Mr. Ray Alexf the duly authorized agent 
requested in an amicable manner that I meet with his supervising 
principal/ Mr. Steven J. Nelsonf the following day, September 10r 
1988. 
The Appellant cordially greed to visit with his supervising 
principal/ Mr. Steven J. Nelson/ and his managing agent/ Mr. Ray 
Alex, on September 10/ 1988. Principal and Agent (admitted on 
motion to strike counterclaim and alternative reply second defense, 
[R at 65 p. 2 par. 3]) for purposes of explaining their own 
contract provisions. Please review Defendant's Answer (par. No. 
4)/ (R at 70). 
The Appellant further requested damages for the unlawful 
locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, 
notwithstanding the written warning letters (App-9f 10f and 13) 
with an arrogant announcement "take me to court"/ Appellant's 
Answer (par. 8) (R at 70). 
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The Respondent's alleged, Complaint allegation No. 15 (R at 
74) and the Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson (par No. 4), (R at 56). 
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-14) states that the 
Appellant entered into another agreement or appropriate written 
notice for Owner occupancy termination. The Respondent did not 
provide any payment of moving expenses for the one terminating the 
occupancy on September 10, 1988. However, the Respondent finally 
admits (R at 29 par. 2), "Plaintiff does not rely on any other 
agreement besides the initial written agreement". The Respondent, 
did not provide any written notice of occupancy termination, only 
the appropriately noticed, per the Rental Agreement, the required 
threshold, prior to becoming effective, rent-rate increase to be 
effective October 1, 1988. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-
15), Defendant's (Exhibit 6), (R at 70). 
The Appellant appropriately complied with the Respondent's 
properly noticed rent-rate increase, utilizing the appropriate set-
off and counterclaim amortization of a lien, for trover and 
conversion, (previously warned, App-9, 10, 13) and verbally 
demanded on September 10, 1989 (R at 70 par. 8) during which the 
Respondent with full knowledge persisted in the willful violation 
of the implied covenant to undisturbed access, since the demanded 
court action is slow and very expensive during which time the 
Respondent enjoyed the benefits of the Appellant's cash, but denied 
inappropriately the Appellant's enjoyment to undisturbed access 
professed as an implied covenant for nearly 5 months, on letter 
dated October 10, 1988. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-
16) Defendant's (Exhibit 8), (R at 70). 
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The Respondent's duly authorized agent—with apparent 
authority—an unnamed male person appropriately noticed the 
decreased rent October 20, 1988, to be effective retroactive for 
October 1988 to be $40 for both storage units Nos. 143 and 144 and 
for November 1988 to be $40 for both storage units Nos. 143 and 
144, effective November 1, 1988. 
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-17) Defendant's 
(Exhibit 7), (R at 70). This appropriately noticed decreased rent 
since October 20, 1988, has not been controverted or explained in 
any way, (R at 50 par. 13), dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par. 
3) dated June 16, 1989. 
The Respondent's affiant, Steven J. Nelson, asserts without 
any evidence, contractual notification requirements, explanations, 
or controverting statements, Affidavit dated May 15,1989, (par. 8 
and 9), (R at 56) (App-14) that Mthe monthly rental and the rental 
value of the two units occupied by Echols is and has been at least 
. . . $94 per month . . . effective in October." The monthly 
rental-rate is $40 per month for both units as noted as page (App-
17). The monthly rental value is established from a rental-rate 
verbal telephone "Cartel" as testified by the Respondent's affiant-
-Audrey Hooper's deposition dated April 29, 1989, page No. 12 as 
page (App-11) and page No.13. A copy is attached hereto as page 
(App-18) (R at 50). 
The Appellant appropriately complied with the Respondent's 
properly noticed rent-rate decrease by the duly authorized agent-
-with apparent authority—an unnamed male person, utilizing the 
appropriate set-off and counterclaim amortization of a lien, for 
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trover and conversion, previously warned (App-9, 10, 13) and 
verbally demanded September 10, 1989 (R at 70 par. 8) hand 
delivered—November 10, 1988. This was recognized, received and 
accepted. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-19), Defendant's 
(Exhibit 8), (R at 70). 
The Respondent, once again, locked the Appellant's 
appropriately amortized set-off and counterclaimed storage unit 
doors from November 10, 1988 through January 5, 1989; admitted 
second defense (R at 65, p. 2. par. 9) a continued and repeated 
violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed access previously 
warned October 10, 1988, as page (App-16), (R at 70). 
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again 
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien with the 
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male 
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered 
letter dated December 10, 1988 as full payment of rent. A copy is 
attached hereto as page (App-20), (R at 70), Defendant's (Exhibit 
8). 
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again 
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien with the 
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male 
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered 
letter dated January 10, 1989, as full payment of rent. A copy is 
attached hereto as page (App-21), Defendant's (Exhibit 8), (R at 
70). 
The supervising principal, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, with full 
knowledge of the non-cash amortizations at the time—October 1988 
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through January 1989—(App-16, 19, 20, 21), Affidavit of Steven J. 
Nelson dated May 15, 1989 (Par. No- 2) as page (App-14), (R at 56) 
filed a cause of action served by mail on January 20, 1989 (R at 
74) alleging various claims against the Defendant-Appellant 
notwithstanding his own demand to "take me to court", when the only 
amount of cash owing to the Respondent was $160, [$40 times 4 
months equals $160, amortizations (App-16, 19, 20, 21)] 
notwithstanding the amount owed to the Appellant from the 
Respondent in the amount of $5,557.57 as page (App-21), (R at 70). 
The Respondent's $160 had already been subtracted from the amount 
owing to the Appellant, consequently no default existed, as 
alleged. 
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again, 
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien to the 
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male 
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered 
letter dated February 9, 1989, as full payment of rent and further 
recognition that the Rental Agreement was in full force and effect. 
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-22) Defendant's (Exhibit 8), 
(R at 70). 
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again 
and for the months of March, April, May, June and July, 1989, 
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien to the 
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male 
person, who recognized, received, and accepted the hand delivered 
letters dated March 10, 1989, April 10, 1989, May 9, 1989, June 9, 
1989, (R at 49) dated July 10, 1989, (R at 23). A copy is attached 
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hereto as page Nos. (App-23 through App-27) respectively, as full 
payment of rent and full recognition that the Rental Agreement was 
in full force and effect. No appropriate rent-rate increases were 
received since October 20, 1988; nor was an appropriate Rental 
Agreement termination—written notice—ever served on the 
Appellant, no default existed as alleged! 
Notwithstanding the specific and relevant facts of the only 
existing Rental Agreement [notification requirements], the 
Respondent's implied covenant to undisturbed access [the painted 
sign], the appropriate and timely payments [App-4 and 7], at the 
legal noticed rate [App-4], during which time the Respondent 
persisted with the willful and wanton violation of the implied 
covenant to undisturbed access [R at 56 p. 3 par, 14 admitted] 
directly causing damages for trover and conversion [previously 
warned (App-9, 10, 13), (R at 70)] of the Appellant's business 
property [R at 69], ignoring foolhardily—the previous warnings 
[App-9, 10, 13]—and the rule that the Appellant's duty to pay rent 
was mutually dependant upon the Respondent's fulfillment of his 
implied covenant to undisturbed access• Consequently, the 
appropriate and timely set-off and counterclaim [White v. District 
Court, (R at 50 p. 9)], the appropriate and timely amortizations 
of the Appellant's lien [King v. Firm (R at 50 p. 9)] for the full 
and timely payments of rent at the legal noticed rate [App-15 and 
17]. The trial court granted a summary judgment against the 
Appellant on the surmised presumption that all of the Respondent's 
asserted claims set forth in this motion for Summary Judgment dated 
May 16, 1989, (R at 56) were in fact valid; worthy of legal 
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immediate enforcement, (R at 48) (App-45), dated June 15, 1989. 
The Respondent, notwithstanding the Appellant's published 
absence dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5), the published 
warning dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6) the minute entry 
judgment dated June 15, 1989, instruction "Counsel for Plaintiff 
is to prepare Order and Judgment," (R at 48) (App-45) tested his 
judicial influence, as a lawyer, specifically violating Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504 (1), (2) and (5) (App-28) as 
directed by the Court, set forth his own misconduct, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration Rule 8.4. (a) and (b) (App-29) by inducing 
the Clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department to 
sign his proposed Execution, Order of Sale, and Writ of Restitution 
dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42) in violation of Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (2) and (3) (App-30) thereby 
setting into motion violations against the Appellant. Utah 
Judicial Code Nos. 78-36-1 "Forcible Entry" and 78-36-2(2) 
"Forcible Detainer" (App-31) whereby in the Appellant's published 
absence seized upon the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his 
children's personal and business property stored at American Self 
Storage in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
Amendments IV and XIV (App-32) and Utah Peaceable Possession 
statute Utah Judicial Code 78-36-9 (App-33) (R at 69 p.4 para. 12) 
the Appellant had been in the quiet possession thereof for the 
space of one whole year continuously next before the commencement 
of the proceedings and that his interest therein is not then ended 
or determined. Review (R at 42) executed during the Appellant's 
published absence, since June 28, 1989. 
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The Appellant filed on July 10, 1989, a Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order (R at 35) and a proposed Order to Grant Temporary 
Restraining against the Plaintiff (R at 33). The court granted the 
Temporary Restraining Order, the Honorable Judge Dimick signed on 
July 11, 1989. However, in violation of the Temporary Restraining 
Order (R at 33) and the unauthorized clerk-signed court orders (R 
at 42) the court, the Honorable Judge Dimick violated Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct Canon Nos. 1, 2(a), 3(3), and (4), as page (App-
34) setting forth improper exparte communications to the Sheriff's 
office and to opposing council as to not abiding by the terms and 
conditions of the said signed court orders. 
The Respondent's legal council, Mr. Lynn P. Heward, violated 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 3.4. (c) as page (App-35) not obeying the said signed Court 
Orders [Temporary Restraining—Exempt Property (R at 42)] Rule 
8.3.(b) and page (App-36) failed to properly report the 
inappropriate conduct set forth in the above stated paragraph and 
Rule 8.4.(d) and (f) as page (App-37) knowingly assisted a judge 
or judicial officer [the Sheriff] in conduct that is a violation 
of applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law, the Forcible 
Entry, the Forcible Detainer, statutes U.S. Constitution 4th and 
14th Amendments (App-32) during the Appellant's published absence, 
further and again on July 11, 1989, prior to 12 noon; the Exempt 
Property Laws—Utah Judicial Code 78-23-0 as page (App-38), 
Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2. [Property rights of married 
women] as page (App-39) on July 11, 1989, whereby the officiating 
Sheriff proclaimed under the prearranged directions from the 
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Respondent, that the Appellant was under arrest for trespassing and 
that any inspections of the property could not be made unless the 
Appellant was to be locked in (R at 31). Subsequently, to the 
Appellant's demanded execution (R at 31) the Honorable Judge Dimick 
filed minute entry dated July 12, 1989, (R at 32) whereby the 
Appellant was denied any access, property accounting, etc.; no 
force or effect whatsoever to any exempt property rights of the 
Appellant, his spouse, or his children. 
The Respondent filed several motions with the trial court 
commencing June 27, 1989, through July 14, 1989, perhaps the most 
significant ones were filed subsequent to the verbal exparte 
communications dated July 11, 1989, the refusal to obey either 
signed court order [Temporary Restraining and Exempt Property (R 
at 42)] with the trial court, whereby the orchestrated and 
conspired actions needed window dressing. Hence, objection to 
Defendant's motion for a temporary restraining order dated July 
12, 1989, (R at 28), and objection to Defendant's motion to vacate 
Summary Judgment dated July 12, 1989, (R at 29). The Appellant 
filed several motions with the trial court commencing June 19, 
1989, through July 21, 1989, in attempting to make the court aware 
of the genuine issues needed to be resolved that were judicially 
ignored in the legally presumptive Summary Judgment dated June 15, 
1989, (R at 48) (App-45). 
Perhaps the Appellant's most significant summary of genuine 
issues is that found on July 17, 1989, Appellant's motions (R at 
22) and (R at 24). The Appellant's motion for a new trial dated 
June 19, 1989, (R at 45) meant nothing for this State's case law 
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is just a written story with no force or effect. The Respondent's 
objection to Appellant's motion for a new trial (R at 41) set forth 
several genuine issues to no avail for the Appellant. 
Consequently, the Trial Court ruling dated July 20, 1989, (R at 18) 
(App-46) exhausted the judicial proceedings in the lower court. 
The Appellant, appropriately and in a timely manner filed 
notice of Appeal dated July 20, 1989, (R at 15) and appropriately 
in a timely manner served the Respondent with the Notice of Appeal-
-Rules of Court of Appeal Rule 3(e); also served the Respondent 
with Notice of Property Bond Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5. (1) 
2(b). 
"This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons • . . The form of 
the bond is at the Defendant's option . . . 
The Defendant may remain in possession if he 
executes . . . bond." 
copy of the cited judicial code as page (App-40) and a copy of 
the cited service is as page (App-1). 
The Respondent, notwithstanding the Exempt Property laws— 
Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2., (App-39); the Utah 
Exemption Act. Code No. 78-23-0 (App-38); the unauthorized clerk-
signed court orders dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42) and the 
Appellant's personally served property bond—at 9:40 a.m.—dated 
July 21, 1989, (App-1) with the specific language: 
HIn no event, however, shall such action by 
the court relieve the party obtaining the same 
[American Self Storage] from any liability 
which may be incurred in consequence of the 
action taken by him, [them] for which he shall 
be and continue to be liable to any other 
person [William L. Echols] or part as fully 
and completely as if a bond or undertaking 
were in fact given. Namely: the Auction to 
commence on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon." 
maliciously with timely forewarning disposed of the Appellant's, 
his spouse's, and his children's property for the purported 
disclosed sum of $2,300. (R at 79) and (AR at attach No. 2B and 
7) and (AR at par. Nos. 27 and 28). 
The Respondent's request for bonding pursuant to Rules Utah 
Court of Appeals No. 6, and the Appellant's dispute over the sale 
of his personal and business property as affecting any bonding; 
thus the Trial Court instituted Notice of Setting dated August 23, 
1989, (AR at par. 2) and (AR at attach. No. 1). 
The Appellant and the Respondent appeared in the Trial Court 
on September 26, 1989, at 9 a.m. pursuant to the Notice of Setting 
with some unusual circumstances surrounding the hearing—Oral 
Arguments i.e. bonding—specifically (AR at par. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7) and (AR at attach Nos. 3, 2, 4, 6, and 5). 
The Respondent with the judicial entrapment of the Appellant 
while appearing for Oral Arguments i.e. Bonding, verbally motioned 
the Trail Court subsequent to Oral Arguments for an immediate 
Supplemental Relief motion, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8, as page 
(App-41) whereby the Trial Court granted the immediate motion 
against the Appellant specifically (AR at par. Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18) and (AR at attach Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, and 14). 
The Appellant is entitled to damages arising from the sale of 
exempt property, specifically (AR at par. Nos. 19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, and 32) and (AR at attach Nos. 15, 14, 10, and 11). 
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
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I. Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in considering rent-rate increases in 
violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirementsy as to 
a required thresholdf prior to becoming effective? 
II. Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in not recognizing rent-rate decreases not 
subject to Rental Agreement notification requirements, as to a 
required threshold, prior to becoming effective? 
III. Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in not recognizing that the supervising 
principal had full knowledge of the duly authorized managing agent-
-with apparent authority—at the time in performing specific acts: 
(A) Establishment of initial rent-rates. 
(B) Establishment of increased rent-rates. 
(C) Establishment of decreased rent-rates. 
(D) Inappropriately locking the Appellant's rent-paid 
storage unit doors, wilfully violating the implied 
covenant to undisturbed access. 
(E) The acceptance of the timely paid, and the 
appropriate amount of cash rental payments. 
(F) The acceptance of the timely paid and the 
appropriate amount of non-cash amortization of the 
Appellant's lien for the timely rental payments. 
as to constituting ratification of those acts, by the principal? 
IV. Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in not recognizing that the Appellant is 
entitled to an appropriate set-off and counterclaim, for trover and 
conversion of his business property, the non-cash amortization of 
a lien, directly resulting from the Respondent's wilful and wanton 
locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, a clear 
violation by the Respondent, of the Respondent's implied covenant 
to undisturbed access? 
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V. Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in not recognizing the Appellant's rights 
to possession of the Respondent's premises in violation of the 
Rental Agreement termination requirements, particularly when the 
rent was fully paid and accepted; notwithstanding the Respondent's 
wilful and wanton breach of the implied covenant to undisturbed 
access? 
VI. Did the Trial Court err in signing the Order of 
"Execution" dated June 28, 1989, the "Order of Sale" dated June 28, 
1989, and the "Writ of Restitution" dated June 28, 1989, in direct 
violation of Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (1), 
(2), and (3); thereby seizing the Appellant's, his spouse's, and 
his children's property including self-help to the property, during 
his published absence dated June 19, 1989, in direct violation of 
Utah Judicial Code Nos. 78-36-1 "Forcible Entry", 78-36-2(2) 
"Forcible Detainer", 78-36-9 "Peaceable Possession"; Constitution 
of Utah, Art XXII Sec.2., Constitution of U.S. IV and XIV 
Amendments? 
VII. Did the Trial Court err in, minute entry dated July 12, 
1989, not allowing the Appellant: 
(A) Access to the seized property. 
(B) Verified accounting of the seized property. 
(C) Exempt property allowances pursuant to the 
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of 
Sale" dated June 28, 1989. 
(D) Exempt property allowances pursuant to: 
(1) Constitution of Utah, Art XXII Sec. 2. 
(2) Utah Exemptions Act, Judicial Code 78-23-0. 
notwithstanding, the Appellant's motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, the Appellant's signed Temporary Restraining Order on July 
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11, 1989, and the prepared Execution unsigned dated July 12, 1989? 
VIII. Did the Trial Court err in selling the Appellant's, his 
spouse's, and his children's exempt property on July 25, 1989, at 
12 noon in violation of: 
(A) The Appellant's property bond—Utah Judicial Code 
78-36-8.5, WARNING to the Respondent served July 21, 
1989, at 9:40 a.m. 
(B) Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec.2., since most 
of the property items stored in the facilities were 
those of the Appellant's separated wife and 
children. 
(C) The Utah Exemption Act. 
(D) Exempt property allowances pursuant to the 
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of 
Sale" dated June 28, 1989? 
IX. Did the Trial Court err in granting a verbal motion for 
supplemental relief, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8 against the 
Appellant, Pro-se during the properly noticed—Oral Arguments— 
re: bonding in violation of: 
(A) Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8. 
(B) Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7(f) since the case was 
on Appeal—in Utah Court of Appeals. 
(C) U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment? 
X. Did the Trial Court err in usurping jurisdiction in 
violation of the Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7-(f) since the case 
was on Appeal, in Utah Court of Appeals for improperly noticed— 
verbal motion—supplemental relief—Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-
8, whereby the Appellant, was required to answer numerous 
questions, without appropriate property accounting i.e. EXEMPT 
PROPERTY; thus held in Contempt of Court in the Utah County jail, 
without appropriate written questions, (knowledge) for the purpose 
of locating and seizing other Appellant's property, constituting 
unlawful incarceration? 
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XI. Is the Appellant entitled to the reimbursement of the 
actual property—undamaged—or the monetary current replacement 
value for trover and conversion of the sold exempt property as a 
minimum, but all property should be fully replaced? 
XII. Are the Appellant, his spouse, and his children entitled 
to injunctive relief, all damages which include but not limited to 
unlawful incarceration, reputation, mental cruelty, mental anguish, 
punitive, property replacement—including video games—since the 
sale of spare parts and repair manual—Appellant's Exempt Property-
-renders them valueless whereby the remaining aged life is very 
limited, the reinstatement of the Appellant's counterclaim, 
commingled with the appropriate amended counterclaim, costs and 
attorney's fees no less. Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-13? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE SEPARATE APPENDIX 
A. U.S. Constitution 4th and 14th Amendments. 
B. Utah Constitution Art. XXII Sec. 2. 
C. State of Utah Statutes. 
D. State of Utah Rules of Administration. 
E. State of Utah Judicial Conduct. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in granting a Summary Judgment against 
the Appellant in considering rent-rate increases in violation of 
the Rental Agreement, in not recognizing rent-rate decreases, in 
not recognizing ratification by the Respondent, in not recognizing 
the Respondent's persisted violation of the implied covenant to 
undisturbed access, in not recognizing the Appellant's rights to 
counterclaim and possession of the premises, in not following 
appropriate procedures for accountability of the Appellant's exempt 
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property, unlawfully selling exempt property, unlawful supplemental 
relief proceeding, unlawful incarceration, and the Appellant's 
entitlement to property and damages, all discussed and argued in 
the following numbered issues: I through XII. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ISSDE I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT IN CONSIDERING RENT-RATE INCREASES IN VIOLATION OF 
THE RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED 
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE, (APP-42). 
"Owner may increase the Rent by notifying 
Occupant in writing at least 15 days prior to 
the first day of the month for which the 
Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall pay the 
Increased Rent from the date it becomes 
effective* An Occupant unwilling to pay the 
Increased rent may terminate the Rental 
Agreement as provided in Item III below.w 
In order for an increase in rent to be effective the first day 
of the month it must be notified to the Occupant by the 15th day 
of the month prior to becoming effective. For example: the rent 
increase to be effective January 1, must be notified to the 
Occupant ini writing by December 15. This must be so, for the 
Occupant to follow the remaining portion of the said Rental 
Agreement i.e. "An occupant unwilling to pay the Increased Rent may 
terminate the Rental Agreement as provided in Item III below.'1 
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy 
created by this Rental Agreement by delivering 
written notice to the other party of its 
intention to do so at least 15 days prior to 
the last day of the Rental Month." 
Consequently, the 15th day of each month constitutes decision day 
for the Occupant, given Owner periodic properly notified rent-rate 
increases whereby the Occupant would be required to move out by the 
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end of the month if given appropriate written notice to the Owner 
of his intention to do so. 
The beginning of any month the effective rent-rate is 
determined by the proper notification requirement 15 days prior to 
that date, or the existence of the legal rate. For example: the 
rent increase notified on May 24 is not effective on June 1. The 
required 15 days prior to the 1st day of the month notification 
requirement threshold has not been met. Neither is the rent 
increase notified on May 24 effective on July 1. Since the rent 
for June is the same effective legal rent-rate prior to May 24th, 
which pivots on the 15th day of each month prior to becoming 
effective in order for the occupant to make appropriate decisions 
as to occupancy termination. 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court clearly erred in requiring 
the Appellant to pay $80 per month for the months of June, July, 
August and September 1988, (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14) resulting from 
the improperly notified rent-rate increase (App-8) (R at 70). 
Furthermore, the Trial Court clearly erred in requiring the 
Appellant to pay $94 per month for the months of October, November, 
December 1988, and January, February, March, April, May, June, and 
July 1989. (R at 56 p. 5 par. 29), since the appropriate legal 
rental-rate was properly amortized (APP-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, and 27) pursuant to the appropriate rent-rate decrease 
(APP-17) which has never been appropriately increased. (R at 50 
par. 13) and (R at 46 par. 3). The Trial Court's reliance upon the 
Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29), were clearly in 
err and a violation of the contractual notification requirements. 
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A case in point states: 
M
. . . a foundational rule is that if there is 
any doubt or uncertainty in the language, it 
should be strictly construed against the 
plaintiff landlord, who furnished the lease 
and required the tenant to sign.11 
Bonneville on the Hill Co, v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977); see 
also Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950). 
ISSUE II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING RENT-RATE DECREASES NOT SUBJECT 
TO RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED 
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE. 
The Rental Agreement makes no specific notification 
requirements, as to a required threshold, prior to becoming 
effective, for rent-rate decreases. Therefore, the appropriately 
noticed decreased rent dated April 20, 1988, to be effective May 
1, 1988, (App-4). Clearly changed the rental rate to $55 per month 
to be effective May 1, 1988. The Appellant in a proper and timely 
manner, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Rental 
Agreement, (App-42) which states, II Rent: 
"Occupant shall pay in legal currency to Owner 
at the Owner' s agent located at the site in 
advance, on the first day of the month, the 
Rent for that month. Occupant agrees to pay 
a $7 late fee for all payments not received 
within 10 days from the first day of the 
subject month for which payment is due." 
paid the appropriately noticed decreased rent (App-4) on May 6, 
1988, which was recognized, received, accepted, and deposited in 
the bank on May 7, 1988, (App-4), by the duly authorized agent— 
with apparent authority. 
The case at bar denied the apparent authority—Ms. Audrey 
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Hooper, (R at 65 p.2 par lf 2, and 3) which states: "Admits, but 
affirmatively alleges that the said agents had no authority on 
their own to reduce the rent." 
A case in point states: 
"It is a general principle of law of agency, 
running through all contracts made by agents 
with third parties, [the Appellant] that the 
principals [the Respondent] are bound by the 
acts of their agents [Ms. Audrey Hooper] which 
fall within the apparent scope of the authority 
of the agents, and that the principal will not 
be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties, who have 
dealt with those agents in good faith." 
Harrison v. Auto Securities Co,, 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927). 
Furthermore, since the Rental Agreement did not have specific 
language as to rent-rate decreases as to notification requirements 
prior to becoming effective there is no bar, or requirement for the 
Appellant to pay anything other than the appropriately noticed 
amount of rent in a timely manner. 
A case in point states: 
M
. . .a foundational rule is that if there is 
any doubt or uncertainty in the language, it 
should be strictly construed against the 
plaintiff landlord, who furnished the lease 
and required the tenant to sign." 
Bonneville on The Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977); 
see also Wolf v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950). 
The non-cash payment of rent at the reduced rate dated October 
20, 1988, (App-17) involves other issues presented for review. 
However the reduction portion of the issue is uncontroverted in any 
way (R at 50 par. 13) dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par. 3) 
dated June 16, 1989, with the same arguments as above. 
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Furthermore, the monthly rental-rate of $40 per month (App-17) and 
the monthly rental value of the asserted $94 per month (App-14 par. 
8 and 9) must be differentiated since the rental value must pass 
through the required threshold, the appropriate contractual 
notification requirements prior to becoming effective, thus 
establishing the monthly rental-rate. This did not happen since 
October 20, 1988. Consequently, the effective legal rental rate 
is $40 per month for both units. The Trial Court's reliance upon 
the Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29) were clearly 
in err and a violation of the contractual notification 
requirements. 
ISSDE III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE SUPERVISING PRINCIPAL 
HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE (APP-11) OF THE DULY AUTHORIZED MANAGING AGENT-
-WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY—AT THE TIME—IN THE PERFORMING OF 
SPECIFIC ACTS: (R AT 65 P.2 PAR. 1, 2, AND 3); AS TO CONSTITUTING 
RATIFICATION OF THOSE ACTS BY THE PRINCIPAL. 
(A) Establishment of the initial rent-rates (App-42). 
(B) Establishment of increased rent-ratesf Feb. '88 and 
(App-15). 
(C) Establishment of decreased rent-rates (App-4 and 
17). 
(D) Inappropriately locking the Appellant's rent-paid 
storage unit doors wilfully violating the implied 
covenant to undisturbed access (R at 56 p. 3 par. 
14 and 23). 
(E) The acceptance of the timely paid rent at the 
appropriate legal notified amount of cash rental 
payments (App-4 and 7). 
(F) The acceptance of the timely paid rent at the 
appropriate legal notified amount of non-cash 
amortizations of the Appellant's lien for the 
current rental payments (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, and 27). 
The case at bar with the specific relevant fact citations as 
noted above clearly renders to the Appellant the appropriate claim 
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of ratification, whereby the Respondent is required to pay instead 
of the Appellant. 
"Ratification relates back to the time when the 
unauthorized act was done; and although the 
act may have been done without any precedent 
authority, ratification creates the relation 
of principal and agent." 
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 89 (Utah 1975). 
"A deliberate and valid ratification with full 
knowledge of all the material facts is binding 
and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled." 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649, P.2d 78 (Utah 1982). 
"It is a general principal of the law of 
agency, running through all contracts made by 
agents with third parties, that the principals 
are bound by the acts of their agents which 
fall within the apparent scope of the authority 
of the agents, and that the principals will not 
be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties who have 
dealt with those agents in good faith." 
Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927). Clearly 
and precisely the Trial Court erred in granting a Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant in requiring the Appellant to pay for the 
ratified acts of the Respondent; no default exists, and the 
Appellant was entitled to possession. 
ISSUE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
AN APPROPRIATE SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM, FOR TROVER AND CONVERSION 
OF HIS BUSINESS PROPERTY, THE NON-CASH AMORTIZATION OF A LIEN, 
DIRECTLY RESULTING FROM THE RESPONDENT'S WILFUL AND WANTON LOCKING 
OF THE APPELLANT'S RENT-PAID STORAGE UNIT DOORS, A CLEAR VIOLATION 
BY THE RESPONDENT, OF THE RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED COVENANT TO 
UNDISTURBED ACCESS. 
The relevant facts of the case at bar is clear. The 
Respondent has, where all can see (the painted sign), declaring the 
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implied covenant to undisturbed access. The Respondent adamantly 
admits locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, (R at 
56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) at the same time when accepting the 
appropriate and timely payments of rent (App-4 and 7). The 
Appellant properly and appropriately warned of damages for the 
wilful locking of his storage unit doors (App-9, 10, and 13) and 
the Appellant's attempt to settle September 10, 1988, (R at 70 par. 
8). 
The California Courts recognition of implied covenants of 
habitability should be differentiated in this case at bar to 
reflect the same enforcement for undisturbed access thereby giving 
tenants' rights for counterclaim directly resulting from the 
landlords unlawful wilful locking of the storage unit doors. 
Please review the court's discussions in Green v. Superior Ct. of 
City and Cty. of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 
1182 (Cal. 1974), and consider that: 
MOnce we recognize that the tenant's obligation 
to pay rent and the landlord's [implied 
covenant to undisturbed access] are mutually 
dependant, it becomes clear that the landlord's 
breach of such [implied covenant] may be 
directly relevant to the issue of possession. 
If the tenant can prove such a breach by the 
landlord, he may demonstrate that his 
nonpayment of rent was justified and that no 
rent is in fact "due and owing" to the 
landlord. Under such circumstances, of course, 
the landlord would not be entitled to 
possession of the premises." 
See also Jarvin v. First National Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1082 
(U.S. CA 1970). 
" . . . the landlord sued for possession for 
nonpayment of rent. Under contract principles, 
however, the tenant's obligation to pay rent 
is dependant upon the landlord's performance 
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of his obligation; [Implied covenant to 
undisturbed access].11 
More at home in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 850 (Utah 1981) and 
similar to the case at bar the court enforced, as read by 
implication, various housing codes whereby in the case at bar the 
Appellant requires enforcement of the implied covenant to 
undisturbed access. The court states: 
"Under familiar legal principles the provisions 
of the city's housing code relating to minimum 
leasing standards were by implication read into 
and became a part of the rental agreement.11 
therefore, by implication the professed, HYou keep the key", must 
apply and the subsequent damages should be paid to the Appellant 
for trover and conversion. 
Similar to the case at bar is Gray v. American Surety Company 
of New York, 277 P.2d 438, 439 (Cal. 1954) which states: 
"Whether personal property, unjustly taken is 
put to use or placed in storage, its reasonable 
rental value is just the same. It belongs to 
its owner and he is entitled to the value of 
its use." 
Therefore, the Appellant's business property [video games and pool 
table] inappropriately and unlawfully locked up during the first 
rent-rate-reduction period of time, nearly five months, (R at 56 
p. 3 par. 14) should clearly accrue damages against the Respondent 
for which appropriate and timely amortizations of current rents 
have been paid, (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27); 
then appropriately demanded in his counterclaim. 
Set-off and counterclaim is not new to Utah in applying 
counterclaims against unlawful detainer action for possession of 
realty, White v. District Court, 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951). 
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Consequently/ the Appellant's counterclaim should be reinstated to 
apply to the measurement of any damages purported and proved by 
the Respondent, no default exists. Therefore, the Trial Court 
clearly erred in granting a Summary Judgment against the Appellant 
in not recognizing that the Appellant is entitled to an appropriate 
set-off and counterclaim, for the persisted violations of the 
implied covenant to undisturbed access. Thus, an appropriate lien, 
Utah Code Annotated (1988) section 38-1-20, (App-44) was made and 
amortized. 
ISSUE V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 
POSSESSION OF THE RESPONDENT'S PREMISES IN VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL 
AGREEMENT TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE RENT WAS 
FULLY PAID AND ACCEPTED—WITH EITHER CASH OR NON-CASH 
AMORTIZATIONSf NOTWITHSTANDING THE RESPONDENT'S WILFUL AND WANTON 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO UNDISTURBED ACCESS. 
The Rental Agreement (App-42) states: 
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy 
created by the Rental Agreement by delivering 
written notice to the other party of its 
intention to do so at least 15 days prior to 
the last day of the Rental Month." 
No place in the record of relevant facts is there a document by 
either the Respondent or the Appellant that meets this required 
contractual termination notification requirement. Therefore, one 
has to delve into payments and case law whereby the possession 
issue can be resolved. 
The case Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 560, 
P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1977) states: 
"Where, by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease 
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover 
possession. He waves that right by the acceptance of 
rent. He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time 
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claim a [default] of the lease." 
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the payments 
(App-4 and 7) would resolve this issue in favor of the Appellant 
and deny the Respondent's claim, (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14). 
Furthermore, in the same cited case it states: 
"A landlord seeking enforcement of a [default] 
must take care not to do anything which may be 
deemed an acknowledgement of a continuation of 
the tenancy. Any act done by a landlord 
knowing of a cause for [default] by his tenant, 
affirming the existence of the lease and 
recognizing the lessee as his tenant, is a 
waiver of such [default].11 
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the timely 
monthly amortizations that were recognized, received and accepted, 
despite the filed cause of action, (R at 74 and 71) dated January 
20, 1989, (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27), renders 
this issue again in favor of the Appellant, and denies the 
Respondent's asserted claim (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) 
commingled with the issue of acceptance is the issue of 
amortization, since acceptance of cash may not be the same as 
acceptance of amortization. So one ponders the case Green v. 
Superior Ct. of City and Cty. of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1181 (Cal 
1974) where it states: 
HIf the tenant can prove such a breach by the 
landlord [implied covenant to undisturbed 
access], he may demonstrate that his nonpayment 
of rent was justified and that no rent is in 
fact 'due and owing' to the landlord. Under 
such circumstances, of course, the landlord 
would not be entitled to possession of the 
premises." 
The Respondent admits (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) they locked the 
Appellants rent-paid storage unit doors for nearly five months, 
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depriving the Appellant access to his business property whereby he 
could not earn any cash. Therefore, the state of Utah has allowed 
set-off and counterclaim as appropriate remedies for unlawful 
detainer action for possession. White v. District Court, 232 P. 2d 
785 (Utah 1951). The Appellant applied this case in (R at 29 p. 
3) to no avail, further applied in Court of Appeals Case No. 890455 
to no avail. Nevertheless, the Court states in King v. Firm, 285 
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1955) that: 
"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would 
be required to pay the rent or lose his rights 
to the property under the lease, although the 
landlord owed him more money than the amount 
of the rent. This possibly would not be so if 
it were undisputed that there was presently due 
and owing from the landlord to the tenant more 
money than the amount due and owing by the 
tenant or the rent and the tenant definitely 
claimed the right to offset one claim against 
the other.11 
The Appellant definitely claimed this right (R at 69) to no avail; 
the Appellant definitely provided timely and appropriate monthly 
amortizations (App- 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) to 
no avail. The Trial Court clearly erred in granting a Summary 
Judgment against the Appellant on the premise that the Respondent 
was entitled to possession (R at 56 par. 12, 14, 16). 
ISSUE VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE ORDER OF "EXECUTION" 
DATED JUNE 28, 1989, THE "ORDER OF SALE" DATED JUNE 28, 1989, AND 
THE "WRIT OF RESTITUTION" DATED JUNE 28, 1989, IN DIRECT VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-403 (1), (2), AND 
(3); THEREBY SEIZING THE APPELLANT'S, HIS SPOUSE'S, AND HIS 
CHILDREN'S PROPERTY, INCLUDING SELF-HELP TO THE PROPERTY DURING HIS 
PUBLISHED ABSENCE DATED JUNE 19, 1989, IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF UTAH 
JUDICIAL CODE NOS. 78-36-1 "FORCIBLE ENTRY", 78-36-2(2) "FORCIBLE 
DETAINER", 78-36-9 "PEACEABLE POSSESSION", CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, 
ART XXII SEC. 2., CONSTITUTION OF U.S. IV AND XIV AMENDMENTS. 
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Notwithstanding the issue of possession previously discussed. 
Issue V, the Appellant was in peaceable and actual possession at 
the time of the Forcible Entry, Utah Judicial Code 78-36-9 (App-
33). Since the Appellant specifically published his absence dated 
June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5) for the period of time June 
22, 1989, through July 9, 1989, and published a warning dated June 
19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6). The minute entry judgment dated 
June 15, 1989, (R at 48) (App-45) has only the signature of the 
Honorable John Backlund, Judge. The ruling required the Respondent 
to submit a proposed order, with Appellant's conjecture, pursuant 
to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504 (1), (2), and 
(5) (App-28) which he did. However, not received by the Appellant 
until after the published warnings, and without sufficient enough 
time to analyze before the required departure, set forth in the 
published absence (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5) consequently, no proper 
objection was made by the Appellant (R at 43). The Honorable John 
Backlund, Judge has only his signature on the Order (R at 43), 
dated June 28, 1989. Therefore, the tested judicial influence by 
the Respondent's lawyer may be classified as misconduct, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration Rule 8.4.(a) and (b) (App-29) by 
inducing the Clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork 
Department to sign his proposed Execution, Order of Sale, and Writ 
of Restitution dated June 28, 1989 (R at 42). This would be a 
direct violation of Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-403 (1), 
(2), and (3) (App-30) since the Judges signature is the only one 
on either order. Clerks do not have the authority to sign 
supplemental procedure orders unless their signature appears with 
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the Judge's signature on the minute entry judgment or the order. 
In this case they do not have both signatures! (R at 48), (App-
45), and (R at 43). 
The Respondent in his crafty set of orders (R at 42) during 
the Appellant's published absence presupposes that all of the 
property stored in the facilities is that of the Appellant. 
Consequently, he recklessly omits the exempt property rights of 
married women, Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2., the exempt 
property rights of children should be the same as married women 
from his set of orders, (R at 42). Therefore, armed with the 
auspicate unauthorized clerk-signed Court Orders (R at 42) breaks 
into the properly rented facilities violating Utah statutes 78-
36-1 "Forcible Entry", 78-36-2(2) "Forcible Detainer", (App-31) 78-
36-9 "Peaceable Possession", during the Appellant's published 
absence (App-33), further violating U.S. Constitutional Rights IV 
and XIV Amendments (App-32). The unauthorized rummaging and 
pilfering the spoils, for who gives a care; the Clerk said it was 
OK (R at 42), and the Sheriff said it will all be sold two days 
after he gets here (R at 11); so what the hell, take what you want, 
you're entitled to this property after all he has done to you; go 
ahead get it out of here; when the Appellant gets back I will keep 
him out of here claiming trespassing (R at 31 p.2), so who will 
know the difference. 
The case law which should apply to the facts at bar is Freeway 
Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1969) states: 
"All that an occupant needs to show in order 
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to be protected against self-help eviction is 
to show that he was in peaceful possession of 
the land within five days prior to the unlawful 
entry. If this is shown by a tenant in 
possession, the one entitled thereto must 
secure his rights under the statute; and if he 
takes the law into his own hands and turns a 
tenant in peaceable possession out by means of 
force, fraud, intimidation, stealth, or by any 
kind of violence, he makes himself liable to 
that tenant for damages". 
The Appellant believes the cited facts at bar make the Respondent 
liable for damages, including mental pain and suffering; see also 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
ISSUE VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MINUTE ENTRY DATED JULY 12, 1989, (R 
at 32) NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT: 
(A) Access to the seized property demanded (R at 31 p. 
3). 
(B) Verified accounting of the seized property demanded 
(R at 31 p. 3). 
(C) Exempt property allowances pursuant to the auspicate 
unauthorized clerk-signed "Order of Sale" and Order 
of "Execution" dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42). 
(D) Exempt property allowances pursuant to the 
Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2. (App-39) and 
the Utah Exemption Act, Judicial Code No. 78-23-0 
(App-38) notwithstanding, the Appellant's motion for 
a Temporary Restraining Order (R at 35) and the 
signed Temporary Restraining Order on July 11, 1989, 
(R at 33) and the proposed Execution unsigned dated 
July 12, 1989 (R at 31). 
This issue must look to the intent of the parties to comply 
with the law and the unauthorized clerk-signed Court Orders, 
whereby the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's exempt 
property rights have been wilfully violated by both the Trial Court 
and the Respondent, at a time when they should have been protected 
by the Courts. 
First, one must review the Appellant's reaction specifically 
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(R at 35 par. 2, 6, 7, and 8) upon discovering that his previous 
warning dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6) was directly 
violated by the Court, the Sheriff, and the Respondent, orchestra-
ting in a testeef malicious way to strip the Appellant of his 
property, with no consideration whatsoever for his spouse's or 
children's property. All was the same to them [the Respondent]. 
The Respondent proclaims during the Appellant's published absence, 
setting the tone and the stage for their malicious unlawful acts 
(R at 40 p. 1 and 2) dated June 29f 1989. 
"The Defendant has neither described nor offered any security 
whatsoever. In fact, his said Motion seems to have language that 
would indicate that for various reasons the Defendant is 
impecunious and no security could be made available for the benefit 
of the Plaintiff.-
The Appellant responds (R at 36) dated July 10, 1989. HThe 
Defendant is impecunious directly resulting from damages caused by 
the Plaintiff's illegal and unlawful acts of conversion 
specifically set forth in the Defendant's Counterclaim, [R at 69].H 
The Respondent,s surprised reaction to the Temporary 
Restraining Order dated July 10, 1989, signed July 11, 1989, (R at 
33) compounded their malicious scheme, thus refusing to abide by 
either signed Court Order (R at 33) and (R at 42). Leading the 
troops was the Sheriff, asserting the law and the rights of the 
Respondent, declaring the Appellant was trespassing (R at 31 p. 2) 
and no property accounting was available unless he was to be 
entombed and incarcerated within the storage units, (R at 31 p. 2) 
dated July 12, 1989. A precise inference, with strong feelings of 
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hate, that no exempt property claims would be honored even if they 
were explicitly declared. 
Any Court protection to the Appellant, his spouse, and his 
children was obliterated with the prompt minute entry dated July 
12, 1989 (R at 32) subsequent to the Appellant's filed Execution 
dated July 12, 1989 (R at 31), claiming and asserting property 
rights, which pursuant to Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-12, H . . 
. any other right under this chapter." (App-38) should have stopped 
the sale until full accounting was made. 
The Respondent further proclaims (R at 28) dated July 14, 
1989. "As to the irreparable damages specified in paragraph 6, it 
was a long time in coming. Defendant had a right for many months 
to remove his belongings from Plaintiff's storage units, and he was 
encouraged to exercise that right . . . He cannot complain now when 
his assets are used to partially reimburse Plaintiff for rent and 
legal cost." 
Clearly neither the respondent, nor the Courts would honor 
anything the Appellant wrote. For example, a Temporary signed 
Court Order, a valid Counterclaim, nor would they honor the 
Appellant's Execution, something less than an explicit exempt 
property claim, at a time when they should have. The Appellant is 
entitled to serious damages for this grave err for which the 
Appellant, his spouse, and his children continually suffer, Utah 
Judicial Code 78-23-13 (App-38). 
ISSUE VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SELLING THE APPELLANT'S HIS SPOUSE'S 
AND HIS CHILDREN'S EXEMPT PROPERTY ON JULY 25, 1989, AT 12 NOON IN 
VIOLATION OF: 
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(A) The Appellant's property bond—Utah Judicial Code 
78-36-8.5. WARNING to the Respondent served July 
21/ 1989/ at 9:40 a.m. 
(B) Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. Since most 
of the property items stored in the facilities were 
those of the Appellant's separated wife and 
children. 
(C) The Utah Exemption Act. 
(D) Exempt property allowances pursuant to the 
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of 
Sale" dated June 28 , 1989. 
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner filed 
Notice of Appeal dated July 20f 1989 (R at 15) and appropriately 
in a timely manner served the Respondent at 9:40 a.m. with the 
Notice of Appeal dated July 21f 1989f pursuant to Rules of Court 
of Appeal Rule 3(e). He also served the Respondent with Notice of 
Property Bond/ Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5 (1), 2(b) , as page 
(App-40)/ which states in part: 
MThis Notice shall be served in the same manner 
as service of Summons • . • The form of the 
bond is at the Defendant's option . . . The 
Defendant may remain in possession if he 
executes . . . bond.H 
A signed copy of the timely cited service is as page (App-1). 
The Respondent notwithstanding the Exempt Property laws— 
Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. (App-39); the Utah Exemption 
Act Code No. 78-23-0 (App-38)#the unauthorized clerk-signed Court 
Orders dated June 28 , 1989/ (R at 42) and the Appellant's 
personally served Notice of Appeal/ property bond/ and motion for 
Extra Ordinary Writ (App-1) (AR at par. Nos. 27 and 28) with the 
specific language that states: 
HIn no event# however, shall such action by the 
Court relieve the party obtaining the same 
[American Self Storage] from any liability 
which may be incurred in consequence of the 
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action taken by him [them] for which he shall 
be and continue to be liable to any other 
person [William L. Echols] or party as fully 
and completely as if a bond or undertaking were 
in fact given. Namely: the Auction to commence 
on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon.H 
The Respondent maliciously with timely forewarning disposed of the 
Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's property for the 
purported disclosed sum of $2,300f (R at 79) and (AR at attach Nos. 
2B and 7). The Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. states: 
"Real and personal estate of every female, 
acquired before marriage, and all property to 
which she may afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise, 
shall be and remain the estate and property of 
such female, and shall not be liable for the 
debts, obligations or engagements of her 
husband, and may be conveyed, devised or 
bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried." 
The case at bar brought by the Respondent against the 
Appellant who signed the Rental Agreement (App-42) makes the debt 
that of the Appellant's, not his spouse nor his children. 
Consequently, there is no valid claim of any kind against his 
spouse's or his children's property that was maliciously and 
unlawfully sold, with forewarning on July 25, 1989 at 12 noon; thus 
committing a wilful and very grievous act of Trover and Conversion, 
for which great damage is being suffered by the Appellant, his 
spouse and his children. The Appellant is entitled to an Amended 
Counterclaim resulting from this action, specifically filed with 
the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1989. 
ISSUE IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A—VERBAL MOTION—FOR 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF—UTAH JUDICIAL CODE No. 78-33-8 AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT, PRO-SE DURING THE PROPERLY NOTICED—ORAL ARGUMENTS— 
RE: BONDING IN VIOLATION OF: 
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(A) Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8 (App-41). 
(B) Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7(f) Since the case was 
on Appeal—in the Utah Court of Appeals, (App-43). 
(C) U.S.Constitution 14th Amendment (App-32). 
Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8, Supplemental Relief states: 
(App-41) 
MFurther relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree 
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The 
application therefore shall be by petition to a court 
having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the 
application is deemed sufficient, the court shall on 
reasonable notice, require any adverse party, whose 
rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment 
or decree, to show cause why further relief should not 
be granted forthwith. 
The Respondent properly petitioned the Trial Court for Bond 
for costs on appeal pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule No. 6. 
The Appellant's dispute over the sale of his personal and business 
property affecting any bonding (AR at par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) 
and (AR at attach Nos. 1, 3, 2, 4, 5, and 6). The Trial Court only 
had jurisdiction for bonding, nothing else. Utah Judicial Code No. 
78-4-7(f), since the case was on Appeal in the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Consequently, the—verbal motion—was without appropriate 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the reasonable notice portion of the 
Supplemental Relief statute is violated since open Court—verbal 
motion—does not constitute reasonable notice. 
"The Due Process Clauses of the United States and 
Utah Constitution require notice to a party before 
his or her rights are affected by a judgment." 
Graham V. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 853 (Utah 1981). 
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to 
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present their objections. The notice must be 
of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information, and it must afford a 
reasonable time for those interested to make 
their appearance. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1983). 
The Appellant's due process rights—reasonable notice—were 
clearly violated by the Trial Court. The verbal application is also 
defective, since the Respondent is asserting that he can sell 
exempt property despite the unauthorized clerk-signed Court Orders 
(App-42), exempt property laws of this state (App-38, 39), no real 
accounting of property. (AR par. 8) and (AR attach Nos. 2B and 7). 
What court will make them accountable? For sure, not the Trial 
Court! 
Clearly the Trial Court erred in granting a—verbal motion-
-for supplemental relief causing great damages upon the Appellant 
and his reputation; subsequently, refusing accountability of exempt 
property for which the Appellant, his spouse, and his children 
continually suffer. 
ISSDE X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USURPING JURISDICTION IN VIOLATION 
OF THE UTAH JUDICIAL CODE NO. 78-4-7 (f), SINCE THE CASE WAS ON 
APPEAL—IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE IMPROPERLY NOTICED-
-VERBAL MOTION—SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF—UTAH JUDICIAL CODE NO. 78-
33-8, WHEREBY THE APPELLANT WAS REQUIRED TO ANSWER NUMEROUS 
QUESTIONS, WITHOUT APPROPRIATE PROPERTY ACCOUNTING I.E. EXEMPT 
PROPERTY; THUS, HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT IN THE UTAH COUNTY JAIL, 
WITHOUT APPROPRIATE WRITTEN QUESTIONS (KNOWLEDGE), FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF LOCATING AND SEIZING OTHER APPELLANT'S PROPERTY, CONSTITUTING 
UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION. 
Closely related to this issue is the previous issue centered 
on the due process clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitution which require notice to a party before his or her 
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rights are affected by a judgment. Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 853 
(Utah 1981). The judgment in this issue is Contempt of Court for 
which the Appellant was held illegally in the Utah County jail for 
8 days (AR attach Nos. 9 and 14). 
••Accordingly, in order to justify a finding of contempt 
and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear by 
clear and convincing proof that: 
(1) The party knew what was required of him. 
(2) That he had the ability to comply, 
(3) That he wilfully and knowingly failed and 
refused to do so." 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977). 
Given the fact that this Court may say that the Trial Court 
had jurisdiction, and that the verbal notification requirements did 
not violate constitutional questions for due process—was the 
Contempt of Court proper, notwithstanding the unaccounted for 
exempt property? 
The Respondent asked many questions which were not supplied 
to the Court during the out of Court meeting, (AR at par. 9 and 
10) only the ones supplied on (AR at attach No. 8) were filed. The 
Appellant was intimidated with many other questions that were not 
filed, causing a real concern for the safety and security of his 
family. 
The Appellant did not have knowledge of all that was required 
of him, noted on (AR par. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14). The Appellant, 
upon being asked the questions that were filed with the Court, did 
comply (AR par. 15 and 16), and (AR at attach Nos. 10, 11, and 12). 
Nevertheless, he was sent back to jail until October 4, 1989 (AR 
par. 17 and 18) and (AR at attach Nos. 13, 14, and 15). 
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Clearly, the Trial Court erred in unlawfully incarcerating 
the Appellant for which great damage has been suffered, causing 
severe emotional distress upon the Appellant, his mother, his 
spouse, and his children for which a large amount of monetary 
relief must be granted against the Respondent. 
ISSUE XI 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE REIMBURSEMENT OP THEIR ACTUAL 
PROPERTY—UNDAMAGED—OR THE MONETARY CURRENT REPLACEMENT VALUE FOR 
TROVER AND CONVERSION OF THE SOLD, EXEMPT PROPERTY AS A MINIMUM, 
BUT ALL PROPERTY SHOULD BE FULLY REPLACED. 
A case in point states: 
HA conversion is an act of wilful interference 
with a chattel done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled 
thereto is deprived of its use and possession. 
The measure of damages of conversion is the 
full value of the property. It requires such 
a serious interference with the Owner's right 
that the person interfering therewith may 
reasonably be required to buy the goods . . . 
an auctioneer who sells them in good faith 
becomes a converter since his acts are an 
interference with the control of the property 
or in other words, a claiming of the ownership 
in such property and taking it out of the 
possession of someone else with intention of 
exercising dominion over it is a conversion. 
Thus, a bona fide purchaser of goods for value 
from one who has no right to sell them becomes 
a converter when he takes possession of such 
goods•" 
Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 728 (Utah 1958). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, the 
facts are clear that the Respondent wilfully sold the Appellant1 sf 
his spouse's and his children's exempt property on July 25, 1989, 
at 12 noon, despite a written warning on July 21, 1989, at 9:40 
a.m. (App-1), without any authority or legal right to do so (AR at 
par. 27 and 28) and (AR at attach. No. 2B and 7), (R at 42 ), (App-
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39, 38). Consequently, the specific accounting requested (AR at 
par. 30) must be made for the appropriate claims to be satisfied 
by each, the Appellant, his spouse, and his children. Great damage 
has been experienced including severe pain and suffering. The 
Appellant requires the Amended Counterclaim Motion to re reinstated 
in his favor. 
ISSUE XII 
THE APPELLANT, HIS SPOUSE AND HIS CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, ALL DAMAGES WHICH INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 
UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION, REPUTATION, MENTAL CRUELTY, MENTAL ANGUISH, 
PUNITIVE, PROPERTY REPLACEMENT—INCLUDING VIDEO GAMES—SINCE THE 
SALE OF SPARE PARTS AND REPAIR MANUAL—APPELLANT'S EXEMPT PROPERTY-
-RENDERS THEM VALUELESS WHEREBY THE REMAINING AGED LIFE IS VERY 
LIMITED; THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM, 
COMMINGLED WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO AMEND, COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES, NO LESS. 
Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-13 states: 
"An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the 
individual is entitled to injunctive relief, 
damages, or both, against a creditor. . . [for] 
redress a violation of this chapter." 
Consequently, the sale of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his 
children's Exempt property (AR at par. 27 and 28) and (AR at 
attach. Nos. 2B and 7) (R at 42) requires the imposition of this 
law whereby full restitution may be made. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court clearly erred in granting a Summary Judgment 
for the Respondent. A cursory perusal of the Rental Agreement, the 
appropriate rent-rate notifications, the appropriate and timely 
payments of cash, despite the Respondent's persisted violation of 
the implied covenant to undisturbed access clearly establishes a 
solid foundation for the Appellant's Counterclaim. Thus, yielding 
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an appropriate lien for trover and conversion of the business 
property, whereby the Appellant definitely claimed that right, 
delivering on a timely and regular basis the appropriate monthly 
amortizations at the appropriate legal rate of rent, whereby each 
monthly amortization has been recognized, received and accepted; 
constituting no default or relinquishment of any property 
possession rights against the Appellant. The Respondent's ensuing 
actions of the fraudulent assertions obtaining the wrongfully 
granted and imposed Summary Judgment enforcement upon the Appellant 
has resulted in: breaking and entering during the Appellant's 
published absence, violaltions of U.S. Constitutional rights, 
threats of trespassing, refusal to make appropriate property 
accounting; selling the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his 
children's exempt property—committing grievous acts of trover and 
conversion, unlawful incarceration, for which great damage has been 
suffered by the Appellant, his spouse and his children yielding a 
damage amount far in excess of the trial Court's jurisdictional 
limits. Therefore, the Trial Court—Circuit Court—should be 
reversed and the case remanded with an Order to the District Court 
in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, where an appropriate trial can 
take place—Counterclaim—against the Respondent. In this event, 
the Defendant-Appellant is entitled to full restitution of all 
unexempted property that was previously sold, plus the payment of 
all the costs accrued to date. 
STATEMENT OF DESIRE TO BE HEARD IN ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Defendant-Appellant hereby states that he desires to be heard 
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in Oral Arguments upon submission of this case. 
Respectfully submitted 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
733 North 800 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 377-0705 
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I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief with the corresponding Appendix was mailed to 
Lynn P. Heward #1479, Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 
923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 on this 
day of J)?_£Q_uia%-A— / 1989
 f with full postage 
attached thereon. 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
733 North 800 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 377-0705 
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